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Abstract
We specify and estimate retirement models for singles and married
couples and estimate these on data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel.
We perform some simulations and find strong eﬀects of retirement options
in determining the retirement behavior within diﬀerent household types.
Model estimates are used to simulate the eﬀect of relevant retirement
policies across subgroups. We find that the disadvantageous treatment of
the old age pension in the Netherlands for married households with two
earners has unintended perverse eﬀects on the labor market behavior of
couples.
1 Introduction
Pension receivers in the Netherlands obtain a substantial part of their pension
benefit in the form of an old age pension (AOW). The AOW benefit is a flat
benefit paid by the Social Security administration to all individuals older than
65. The level of the benefit depends on marital status and employment status
of the receiver’s spouse. This study aims to describe and explain retirement
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patterns of diﬀerent types of households in the Netherlands. In particular we
want to know to what extent the AOW is responsible for the observed diﬀerences
in the retirement patterns of singles and couples. Indeed, the dependence of the
AOW benefit of the oldest person in the household on the participation of the
younger partner may aﬀect household participation decisions in a perverse way.
The past three decades have shown a substantial decline in labor force par-
ticipation rates of older workers across most industrialized countries and also in
the Netherlands. However there appears to be considerable heterogeneity in re-
tirement behavior of diﬀerent demographic groups. Participation rates of single
males are lower than the participation rates of their cohabiting counterparts.
Retirement patterns of the heads with a working partner diﬀer substantially
from the patterns observed for heads with a non-working partner.
There is a fair amount of work on the individual retirement decision. It is
generally acknowledged that financial incentives are relevant for the retirement
decision, (Gruber and Wise 1997). However, financial variables alone can not
explain all of the reduction in the participation rate of the past decades. For
the US, for instance, Moﬃt (1987)estimates that financial incentives account for
at most one third of the drop in the participation rate. This finding becomes
relevant, when confronted with the large variation in the retirement trends of
diﬀerent demographic groups. It does not imply that financial incentives are not
important, but that diﬀerences in the preferences for leisure and income between
these diﬀerent demographic groups may also matter. The large variation also
hints that we may need diﬀerent models for couples when we want to explain
retirement behavior of two individuals in a household.
We specify and estimate retirement models for singles and married couples
and estimate these on data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). Model
estimates are used to simulate the eﬀect of relevant retirement policies across
subgroups. We show that the disadvantageous treatment oﬀered to the older
spouse influences retirement behavior at older ages in a perverse way.
Retirement of spouses may be related for several reasons (see for instance
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)). Firstly, because work choices of one member
may aﬀect the financial rewards of work or non-work of the other (for instance,
because of spill-over eﬀects, see Coile (1999)). Secondly, because work out-
comes of one member may aﬀect the relative preference for income and leisure
of the other member directly. Thirdly, because of related preferences of fam-
ily members, other than the just mentioned possible causes1. Christensen and
Datta Gupta (1994) and Coile (1999), focus on the first two reasons for associ-
ation2. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), take a more structural approach3. In
Blau (1998)family retirement is viewed as the outcome of the maximization of a
1Related preferences may occur, for instance, if people with similar preferences match with
each other (assortative matching)
2Their approach is to include individual characteristics, retirement options and labor supply
choices of other family members as explanatory variables in a reduced form labor supply
equation.
3They specify and estimate a structural model for the retirement behavior of spouses. In
their model individual family members have perfect foresight and labor supply behavior follows
from maximization of the individual utility functions subject to a family budget constraint.
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household utility function, in an uncertain and dynamic environment. The main
findings of the empirical studies on family retirement behavior is that there is
an association between the retirement decision of head and wife. More specifi-
cally, retirement status of one member aﬀects the transition probability of the
other ( Blau (1998)and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)), there is evidence of
coordination and this is not due to a coordination of opportunities that heads
and wives face (Gustman and Steinmeier 2000) and that heads have at least as
strong preferences for leisure as wives (Christensen and Datta Gupta 1994).
Our study is similar to the study of Blau (1998), but an important aspect
diﬀers. Our focus is both on the within family retirement dynamics, as well as
diﬀerences in retirement behavior of married couples and singles. We view family
retirement behavior as governed by the weighted sum of the individual utility
functions of the head and partner. These individual utility functions may be
related through direct eﬀects (e.g. because labor supply decisions of one member
aﬀects the utility of the other directly), as well through similar unobserved
preferences. The incentive variables capture the forward looking behavior of
both the head and the partner and also the interactions between these. For
these interactions, we exploit information on diﬀerences in the planning horizon
of head and partner. In addition the results will be used to evaluate the eﬀects
of the AOW and eligibility rules in a broader sense.
The next section describes the Dutch institutional setting. Section 3 in-
troduces the data and looks at the most relevant facts and trends in family
composition and labor supply. Section 4 presents our model and the empirical
implementation. Section 5 gives the results and 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Institutions in the Netherlands
In this section, we provide a short description of the Dutch pension , early
retirement (ER) and the social insurance system made up of unemployment
insurance (UI), and disability insurance (DI).
The Dutch pension system consists of three tiers (see also Bovenberg and
Meijdam (1999)and Alessie and Kapteyn (2001)). The first is Social Security
(SS): everyone in the Netherlands is covered by an old age pension (AOW)
starting at the age of 65. The second consists of funded occupational pensions.
Finally, some retirees (e.g. the ex-self-employed) have privately bought a pen-
sion insurance in the past.
The level of the AOW benefit is independent of tenure, experience or other
income, but does depend on household composition. The rule is that a couple
of which both head and spouse are older than 65, receives in total an AOW
benefit equal to the minimum wage. A single person is entitled to 70% of the
minimum wage. This means that a family receives 50% of the minimum wage
as AOW benefit if the younger partner is still at work, whereas an unmarried
individual would receive 70% of the minimum wage. However, families may
receive a supplementary AOW benefit of 20% if the income of the working
partner is suﬃciently low. In some cases it will be beneficial for the family that
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the younger partner retires. Given the focus of this study, we have explicitly
taken into account the supplementary AOW rules in the computation of the
value of retirement4.
The second tier of the pension system consists of funded occupational pen-
sion plans. Most of these plans are of the defined benefit type and based on
the final pay 5. Family composition matters also in this case as occupational
pensions are computed only for amounts exceeding the AOW-benefit of a couple
(=100% of the minimum wage). However, members of two-earner families or
single person households receive an AOW-benefit of 50% and 70% of the min-
imum wage, respectively. This means that up to retirement of the partner the
family may face a sizable financial penalty.
The first two tiers of the system provide income for individuals aged 65 and
older. However, only 20% of the males aged between 60-64 are still at work. It
has been shown that strong incentives of employer provided Early Retirement
(ER) and social security provided Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Disability
Insurance (DI) programs are responsible for this 6.
Kapteyn and de Vos (1997), Heyma (2001)and Lindeboom (1999)have shown
that the ER schemes in the Netherlands provide strong incentives to retire at
the very moment that individuals become eligible for these schemes.
3 Data, facts and figures
We use the seven waves covering the period 1990 - 1996, of the Dutch Social Eco-
nomic Panel (SEP)7. However, information of the specifics of the ER schemes,
such as the age of eligibility and the benefit replacement rate, are not available.
For this information we will use another data set called the CERRA survey 8.
In this study we present summary statistics of labor supply behavior of
households of which the head9 is aged 50 to 65 in any of the waves. Next,
household members are divided into “head” and “partner”. We use the self-
4This system will not hold for younger cohorts that will become 65 in the next decade. For
these and the younger generations there will be no means tested supplement of 50% and the
individual AOW benefit will simply be 50% of the minimum wage regardless of the income of
the partner.
5Most schemes aim at a benefit level such that the sum of before tax AOW benefits and
before tax occupational pension benefits is equal to 70% of last earned gross wages. The after
tax replacement rate can be substantially higher because retirees do not pay social insurance
premiums.
6We refer to a companion study (Mastrogiacomo et al (2002)) for more details on the UI,
DI and ER schemes.
7It is administrated by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and contains approximately 5000
households per year. In structure and contents this panel survey is similar to the German
Social Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the American PSID.
8Center for Economic Research on Retirement and Aging (see the companion study for a
description).
9Statistics Netherlands defines the head as the man in the household or the “main income
earner” if no man is present. This means that women may also be defined as heads. In
addition any sort of cohabitation may constitute a household
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reported information about the main activity for the employment status 10.
The self-employed are excluded from the sample as are the cases were we lacked
information on essential variables like gender, marital status and employment
status. We will assume in our model of the next section that retirement is
an absorbing state. This assumption is violated in 2% of the cases. We also
discarded these from our data. These sample selection criteria eventually leave
us with information on 2957 couples and 1063 singles. Two types of descriptive
analysis will be presented. First, data are presented for the repeated cross
sections, next we restrict our sample to individuals who participate in at least
two waves of the panel survey for the analysis of transition rates between the
diﬀerent labor market states.
We start with a description of the cross sectional information. Table 1
depicts patterns for labor supply over age for heads and partners. For heads
the drop in labor participation is not very relevant at younger ages, but this
changes after age 55, when individuals become eligible to ER schemes (the so
called VUT schemes, see the Appendix to the companion study). The patterns
also vary according to marital status.
Table 1: Labor market participation over age by marital status
Explanatory note: Repeated cross section period 1990-1996. Source: SEP, own com-
putations
These numbers say little about the division of labor supply within the house-
hold. Table 2 gives the participation rate of the heads, conditional on the labor
force status of the partner. So, for instance, 91% of the 50 years old heads with
a working partner are still at work, whereas somewhat less (87%) of the 50 years
old heads with a non-working partner are.
Since we only consider two states: employed, or out of the labor force (OLF)
we have four possible combinations for couples: both employed; one employed
10We have separated the individuals who reported “paid employment” from the rest (UI,
DI, volunteers etc.)
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Table 2: Head’s labor market participation conditional on partners’ participa-
tion
Explanatory note: Repeated cross section period 1990-1996. Source: SEP, own com-
putations
and the other OLF; both OLF. Table 3 displays family labor supply transition
rates.
Table 3: Joint labor market transition rates in the married household
Explanatory note: Unbalance panel period 1990-1996. Source: SEP, own computations
The transitions are yearly changes from the state of origin to the state of
destination. The diagonal of this table displays the persistence of the diﬀer-
ent family labor supply positions. About 79% of the couples where both are
employed remain in the same situation after one year while about 14% of the
partners stops working. It is interesting to note that when both are at work, it
is more often the partner who stops earlier than the head. The situation where
both are out of the labor force in the initial year is an absorbing state and is
therefore not displayed in the table. Relatively high transition rates out of work
are observed for partners with a non-working head. For singles the transition
rate to OLF is approximately 11% (not displayed in this table).
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To summarize this section, one can conclude that there are large diﬀerences
between the behavior of diﬀerent demographic groups. Singles have lower par-
ticipation rates and higher exit rates out of work. For all groups, large drops
in the participation rates are observed at or around the ages where the VUT
schemes become eﬀective. Retirement is an absorbing state as there is (almost)
no return from non-work states to work. A substantial fraction of the married
couples consist of a working head and a non-working partner. When the head
is out of work, partners appear to have higher transition rates out of work.
4 A model for retirement behavior of couples
and singles
In the previous sections it was concluded the Dutch Institutions provide strong
incentives for the retired to remain retired and that this was confirmed by our
data. As we will see below, this has consequences for our model of family
retirement behavior.
Our model for couples is rather similar to the one of Blau (1998). In other
words, we have formulated a discrete-choice, discrete time model of employment.
Let yi,t = 1 i = h, p if household member i (h= head, p= partner) works in
period t, and yi,t = 0 if he/she is retired, or unemployed or disabled.
11. We
distinguish four diﬀerent states indicated by the random variable yf,t:
yf,t = 0 if yh,t = 0, yp,t = 0 (both spouses unemployed)
yf,t = 1 if yh,t = 1, yp,t = 1 (both spouses employed)
yf,t = 2 if yh,t = 1, yp,t = 0 (only husband employed)
yf,t = 3 if yh,t = 0, yp,t = 1 (only partner employed)
We view retirement as the outcome of a maximization process, where each period
head and partner make their own employment decisions. These decisions are
governed by a comparison of the family utility streams associated with the
diﬀerent employment alternatives. In these alternatives it is recognized that
current decisions aﬀect future retirement benefits and income out of work. Blau
(1998) assumes that preferences are given by a household utility function. In
other words, he does not specify the bargaining process within the household.
We make an attempt to do so. Suppose that the family lives in period τ . We
suppose that the family’s decisions on labor participation is the result of a Nash
bargaining process, i.e. the family inter temporal utility function (Uτ ) can be
written as a weighted average of individual utility flows, i.e.
V (τ) = EτUτ = Eτ
£
λUhτ + (1− λ)Upτ
¤
(1)
where λ denotes the Nash bargaining parameter and V (τ) the value function in
period τ . Eτ is the expectation operator based upon information available in
11We omit household specific subscripts for convenience
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period τ . The intertemporal utility function of the head Uhτ has the following
form (the one of the partner, Upτ , is analogous and therefore omitted):
Uhτ =
ThX
t=τ
(1 + ρ)τ−tuht (ch,t, cp,t, yh,t, yp,t) (2)
where ch,t and cp,t denote consumption of the head and wife, respectively. ρ is a
discount factor. Th denotes the time horizon of the head. We assume that this
time horizon is equal to the calendar year that the head becomes eligible for
the AOW benefit (age 65): Th = τ + (65− ageh,τ ). Notice that because of age
diﬀerence, the partner has a diﬀerent time horizon Tp than the head. In most
cases the partner is younger than the head and therefore retires later in the
future. Like Blau (1998) we allow for state dependency (i.e. the parameters of
the family utility function (1) might depend on past labor participation choices.
Therefore, we attach two subscripts j and k to the value function appearing
in equation (1): Vjk(τ). Subscript yf,τ = k denotes current-period labor force
status of the couple (k = 0, . . . , 3) and j the previous period status.
We can rewrite the decision problem of the household in a dynamic program-
ming format. However, we do not solve the dynamic programming problem as
part of the estimation. Instead, we follow the methodology of Blau (1998) and
approximate the value function Vjk,τ as follows:
Vjk(τ) = Z0kτθj +X
0
τβjk + γjkµ+ ²kτ (3)
where the X 0s are exogenous variables aﬀecting preferences (’taste shifters’) and
expectations. The vector X includes a constant term. µ is an unobserved time-
invariant couple specific random eﬀect. We assume that µ is independent across
households and follows a normal distribution with expectation 0 and variance
σ2µ. ²kτ follows an extreme value type I-distribution. We assume that ²kτ is
uncorrelated over time and across alternatives.
The Z 0s are state-specific ‘incentive’ variables. Since we allow for state
dependency we index the parameter vector θ with the index j (labor force status
of the couple in the previous period). Apart from exploiting the theoretical
framework described above, we need to make some additional assumptions in
order to construct these incentive variables. The first set of assumptions involves
the specification of the inter temporal utility functions of the head and the
partner. For the head it has the following form (for the moment we ignore the
possibility that the preference functions may depend on taste shifters):
uht (ch,t, cp,t, yh,t, yp,t) =
αh1hch,t + α
h
1pcp,t + α
h
2hyh,t + α
h
2pyp,t + α
h
3hyh,tch,t + α
h
3pyp,tcp,t (4)
Both the head and the partner (that has an analogous upt (ch,t, cp,t, yh,t, yp,t))
yield utility from their own log(consumption) ch,t (cp,t) and from spouses’
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log(consumption). The variables yh,tch,t and yp,tcp,t are added to the utility
functions in order to take into account possible non-separability between con-
sumption and labor force participation.
Second, we assume that savings behavior is exogenous, i.e. consumption
of head and partner is equal to their earnings (non-capital income). Third,
we assume that if the head or partner choose to continue working in period
τ , he/she remains working up to his/her early retirement age12. Empirical
work of Lindeboom (1998)suggests that 80% of the employees goes directly into
ER once he/she gets the opportunity to do so and that the other 20% retires
within 1.5 years after the first opportunity. Heyma (2001)reports that 82% of
the potential early retirees in the CERRA data, answering a question about
their future plans, are willing to retire as soon as possible. The validity of the
third assumption is also (partly) confirmed by the extreme high implicit tax
rates (above 100%) which are implicitly levied on labor earnings at the ER
age. This implicit tax rate are so high because the ER-entitlements are very
generous and not actuarially fair (see Kapteyn and de Vos (1997)and Linde-
boom (1999)). Fourth, retirement is an absorbing state. As said before, the
Dutch institutions provide strong incentives for the retirees to remain retired.
Finally, we assume that wage earnings (in real terms) are constant over time
wageh,t = wageh,τ−1, t = τ , . . . , Th, wagep,t = wagep,τ−1, t = τ , . . . , Tp. We
have checked this assumption by estimating an age-earnings profile (a fixed ef-
fects model). It appears that the age coeﬃcients in these wage regressions do
not diﬀer significantly from 0.
Given the assumptions mentioned above, the rules concerning social security,
pension and early retirement (replacement rates etc.) and survival probabilities
of head and partner, we are able to construct the following ‘incentive’ variables.
a The discounted sum from the current period τ to period T ∗ of the following
six variables: 1) cht (Z1
h
1k), 2) cpt (Z1
p
1k), 3) yht (Z1
h
2k), 4) ypt (Z1
p
2k),
5) yhtcht (Z1
h
3k), 6) yptcpt (Z1
p
3k). T
∗ is equal to the time horizon of the
partner, Tp, if the head is older than the partner, and to Th otherwise.
Notice that Z1hl1=Z1
h
l2, l = 1, 2, 3: for the states k=1 (both spouses work-
ing) and k=2 (only the head works), the incentive variables Z1hlk take the
same value. For similar reasons: Z1pl1=Z1
p
l3, l = 1, 2, 3.
b The discounted sum from period min(Th, Tp) + 1 to period max(Th, Tp) of
the following six variables if the head is younger than the partner: 1) cht
(Z2h1k), 2) cpt (Z2
p
1k), 3) yht (Z2
h
2k), 4) ypt (Z2
p
2k), 5) yhtcht (Z2
h
3k),6)
yptcpt (Z3
p
3k), k = h, p. If the head is older than the partner, the ‘Z2’-
variables are equal to minus the discounted sums mentioned above.
12Some information on the ER age is missing in the SEP survey. The CERRA survey is
used to estimate the sector specific probability distribution of the ER age. In the companion
study (Mastrogiacomo et al. (2002)), it is explained how these probability distributions are
used in the computation of the incentive variables. Basically, we compute the value of the
incentive variables for all possible ER ages and then we take the expectation of incentive
variables using probability distributions mentioned above.
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Notice that the coeﬃcients corresponding to the Z2-variables are only iden-
tified due to diﬀerences in the planning horizon of heads and spouse. We have
computed the incentive variables for several values of the discount rate ρ (see
the next section).
If one believes in the assumptions presented above, one may identify the
preference parameters appearing in equation (2) up to the Nash bargaining
parameter λ. For instance, the parameter corresponding Z2h1k is equal to λα
h
1h
and that of Z1h1k to λα
h
1h + (1 − λ)α
p
1h. If one knows λ, one can identify the
two parameters αh1h and α
p
1h. However, in our opinion, the assumption which
are needed to construct the Z-variables are too strong in order to claim that
we identify the ’deep’ underlying preference parameters of the family utility
function. Like Blau (1998), we only use the theoretical framework as a guideline
for the empirical specification of model (3). Notice, however, that in comparison
with Blau (1998) we have exploited more elaborately the theoretical structure:
in the formulation of the incentive variable we take into account that the labor
participation choices of couples is the result of a bargaining process.
After having paid attention to the incentive variables, we have almost fully
explained the value function (3). Suppose that the econometrician knows the
value of µ (later on, we will relax this assumption). Model (3) implies the
following transition probabilities, ηjkτ (µ), from state j to state k:
ηjkτ (µ) = Pr(Vjk(τ)) > Vjm(τ)(j, 1) ∀m 6= k | µ, yf,τ−1 = j) (5)
This expression boils down to a random eﬀect multinomial logit model when ²
is taken as an EV type I distribution. We simplify this model in some further
directions. In the construction of the Z-variables, we assume that retirement is
an absorbing state: η00τ (µ) = 1, η0lτ (µ) = 0, l = 1, 2, 3, ηl1τ (µ) = 0, l = 2, 3,
and η32τ (µ) = η23τ (µ) = 0. The absorbing state assumption, which is confirmed
by the data, implies that in case of the initial labor force states j = 2 or 3,
expression (5) boils down to a binary logit model. Moreover, we barely observe
transitions from labor force status yfτ−1 = 1 to yfτ = 0 (see table 3). Therefore
we assume that η10τ (µ) = 0. Finally we face the problem that we do not have
many observations in which only the partner works in period τ − 1. Therefore
we assume that apart from the constant term β2k = β3k. Moreover, we assume
that γ2k = γ3k. Finally, since in model (5) only utility diﬀerences are identified,
we need to make the following normalizations: β11 = γ11 = 0, β20 = γ20 = 0
and γ22 = 1.
We could estimate the transition models under the assumption that the
initial sample selection does not cause a bias in the estimated parameters. This
assumption might be problematic. The reduced form model which explains
family labor participation in the first period of observation has the following
multinomial logit form:
V1(l) = X
0
1ωl + κlµ+ υl, l = 0, 1, 2, 3
Il(µ) = Pr(yf,1 = l) = Pr(V1(l) > V1(j) ∀j 6= l) (6)
10
Obviously, for identification purposes we have to assume that ω0 = κ0 =
υ0 = 0. Notice that the household eﬀect µ appear both in the transition mod-
els (like equation (5)) and the initial condition equation (6). The likelihood
contribution per household has the following form:
£ =
Z
(
3X
j=0
dj1Ij(µ))
TY
t=2
"
3X
k=0
3X
l=0
dkltηklt(µ)
#
g(µ)dµ (7)
where dklt = 1 if the couple moves from state k in period t − 1 to state l in
period t and equal to 0 otherwise. dj1 = 1 if couple is in state j in the initial
period 1, and 0 otherwise. Ij(µ) is the corresponding probability. Instead of
maximizing the likelihood 7, we estimate the model by means of simulated
maximum likelihood (150 draws).
We will also estimate a model for singles. This model is rather similar to
the one of couples. In other words, the model consists of two parts: a) a binary
logit transition model from work to non-participation, very much in the spirit of
model (3) and b) an initial condition equation which is rather similar to equation
(6). In the transition model we only have three incentive variables instead of
twelve: the Z2- and Z1p-variables are not relevant because no partner is present.
5 Results
The discrete-time discrete-choice model is estimated for couples and singles
(SI)13. Summary statistics are in table 4. The results of the main models are
presented in table 5 (couples) and table 6 (singles)14, respectively15. In the
estimation we have assumed that the rate of time preference (discount factor) is
equal to zero when we calculate the incentive variables. We have also estimated
the model with ρ = 0.1. However, we obtained lower log-likelihood values in
that case. In both models the “unobserved heterogeneity coeﬃcients” (i.e σµ
and ρ in table 6, and σµ, the γ and κ-parameters in table 5 and 8) are not
jointly significant, although σµ diﬀers significantly from 0 in the couples model.
Given this result, we have also estimated (multinomial) logit models explaining
labor force transitions out of work of the head and the partner (if present). The
parameter estimates are rather similar to the ones reported in tables 5 and 6. It
also appears that the transition models without unobserved heterogeneity fit the
data quite reasonably: The pseudo-R2 are equal to 0.327 (two-earner couples),
0.397 (one-earner couple) and 0.369 (singles).
13The parameters estimates of the initial conditions equation for couples and singles are
given in table 8.
14The results are generated using Ox version 3.30 (see Doornik, 2002) and the Arfima
package version 1.00 (Doornik and Ooms, 1999).
15In these tables we report (multinomial) logit coeﬃcients. However in this section we also
discuss some marginal eﬀects. More information about is available from the corresponding
author.
11
In table 5, the upper panel of the table includes time eﬀects and the taste
shifters whereas the lower panel presents the estimates of the coeﬃcients associ-
ated with the incentive variables and the parameters of the mixing distribution.
The first columns refer to estimates of the model, when in the initial state the
household is made up of two earners (TE). In the next period both could again
be at work or either of them could be out of work. We assumed absence of direct
shifts into joint retirement (yf,t−1 = 1, yf,t = 0). This occurred in only 3% of
the sample and prevented us from obtaining reliable estimates for the model.
We took the situation where both are employed as the reference group in this
random eﬀects multinomial logit model.
The last two columns of table 5 refer to estimates of the model for one
earner (OE) couples. As discussed in the previous section in these estimates the
observations of yf = 2 and yf = 3 are lumped together. We restricted the set
of year dummies and the coeﬃcients of the taste shifters to be equal for the two
groups of OE. However, via a dummy variable, we allow for some diﬀerences
between them. The coeﬃcient associated with this dummy variable takes a
significantly negative value, meaning that in a OE couple a working partner
has a higher labor force exit than a working head. The model is flexible in one
other respect: we allow for complete separate sets of estimates of the eﬀect of
the incentives variables Z1 and Z2.16
It has to be noted that for all household groups (SI, OE and TE households)
most of the time eﬀects and the taste shifters do not explain family labor force
transition rates. An important exception are the highly educated. In case
of singles and OE couples, heads with the high education level have a lower
tendency to exit the labor force than head with a low education (the reference
group). The size of the marginal eﬀect is rather similar across singles and OE
couples: for the average single the head’s labor force exit rate of the highly
educated is about 4 percent points lower than that of the low educated. For
the average OE head is trifle lower: 3.4% points. However, the lagged working
status of the partner matters: the eﬀect of education is negligible in case of TE
couples. In the model explaining labor force participation of singles, one other
variable rather seems to be important, namely marital status: the divorced and
the widowed remain longer at work, as compared to the never married. The
estimated marginal eﬀects suggest that the labor force exit rate of the never
married is 3.8 percent points higher. Presumably, in comparison with people
who never married, the divorced need to work longer because they need to pay
alimony.
Contrary to the coeﬃcients corresponding to the taste shifters, the coeﬃ-
cients associated with the incentive variables (the Z−variables) are very signif-
icant. It is diﬃcult to interpret such coeﬃcients directly. The Z20s , however,
are included in the specification because of the diﬀerences in the time horizon
of head and his partner. This diﬀerence in the time horizon is exploited in the
(financial) incentives variables. So, as a first test for the diﬀerences in the plan-
16We also estimated a model, where the estimates θ0s were restricted to be equal for both
groups (yf = 2 and yf = 3). This restriction was strongly rejected by the data.
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ning horizon of head and partner one could look at the statistical significance of
these parameters. A quick glance at the table reveals that the Z2-variables mat-
ter. Indeed, the parameters associated to those variables are jointly significant
(χ26 = 16.9).
5.1 Simulations results
As discussed above, direct interpretation of the parameters associated with the
incentives variables is not straightforward. This is of no particular concern since
we use these estimates to perform some calculations with the model. We will
discuss these below.
In the first simulation we ask the following question: suppose that the heads
of households will experience a 10% (permanent) wage increase: by how much
will the labor force exit rate of the working head and partner (if present) change?
Obviously, some of the incentive variables change as a result of this wage in-
crease. For instance, let’s consider the Z1h1 -variable, i.e. the (discounted) sum
of head’s log(consumption) (=non-capital income).17. If the head chooses to
continue working, the value of the Z1h1 -variable (denoted by Z1
h
11) increases
due to the wage increase. However, the value of the Z1h1 -variable (Z1
h
10) also
increases if the head chooses to exit the labor force because UI-, DI-, ER-benefits
and compulsory occupational pensions are related to labor earnings. But in the
Netherlands this relation is less than proportional and changes over the entitle-
ment period, i.e. the gap between Z1h11 and Z1
h
10 becomes bigger as a result
of the wage increase. Among other things, the choice between working and not
working is determined by this gap. Another incentive variable which is aﬀected
by the wage increase, is Z1h3 : the (discounted) sum of the interaction between
the head’s labor force participation and head’s log(consumption). Obviously,
the gap between Z1h31 and Z1
h
30 also increase due to the wage increase. The
only incentive variables referring to the head which do not change due to the
wage increase, are Z1h2 and Z2
h
2 because they do not depend on the income level
(see previous section for the definition of these variables).
Our calculations suggest that as a result of the wage increase the labor force
exit rate of the average single decreases by 3.2%-points from 4.3% to 1.1%. In
relative terms, this eﬀect is rather high. The eﬀect is rather diﬀerent for couples.
For the average OE couple with a working head, labor force participation is
negatively related to the wage rate (contrary to the singles): the transition rate
out of work increases by 1%-point (from 3.1% to 4.1%). A working partner in
an OE couple (in which the head is OLF) reacts to a 10% wage increase by
staying longer in the labor force. This means that the labor force exit rate of an
average OE couple with a working partner decreases by 1% point (from 17.8%
to 16.8%). Labor supply of TE couples is also not much aﬀected by a 10%
rise in the wage rate of the head: the labor force exit rate of the average head
increases by 0.5%-points (from 1.6% to 2.1%) whereas the labor supply choices
17As we already explained in the previous section, the sum is taken over the period τ (current
period) until Tp (year of retirement of the partner if the head is older than the partner, Th
otherwise). Since we assume that ρ = 0, we basically take the un-discounted sum.
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of the average TE partner are barely aﬀected by the increase in income of the
head. However, results are diﬀerent if the wage of partner is increased by 10%
instead of that of the husband. In that case, the average partner has a higher
tendency to remain in the work force: her labor force exit rate decreases by
0.4%-points (from 5% to 4.6%). The head does not adjust his labor supply as
a result of the rise in the partner’s wage.
Because of the significance and the economic consistency of most of the es-
timated parameters and the marginal eﬀects just described we feel confident to
use the estimation results further. We perform some simulations in order to
decompose the observed diﬀerences in retirement trends of heads of the diﬀer-
ent demographic subgroups and of the partners. These are decomposed into
diﬀerences in parameters and diﬀerences characteristics. In addition, we also
simulate a policy change that exogenously aﬀects the level of the AOW benefit.
We first describe the Oaxaca decomposition results in table 7.
In the Oaxaca decomposition we use in turn each group (SI, OE, TE) as
a base. The decomposition formulas are also reported in table 7. The table
decomposes the eﬀects of parameters and characteristics in the hazard. We re-
port in bold the predicted average hazard rate (this is denoted by Li = 1− y ,
i = h, p) within the model. The other figures give predictions where the ‘incen-
tive variables’ are interchanged across diﬀerent models. This means that when
we read the table vertically we are holding constant the estimated parameters.
When we read the table horizontally we hold constant the incentive variables
(and consequently vary the β0s the θ0s and the X 0s ). The decomposition shows
that the hazard of the diﬀerent groups (excluding the within model prediction)
does not vary much across the diﬀerent set of parameters (columns). For in-
stance, in the first row, the incentive variables of TE households return a very
low hazard both for OE heads (0.1%) and SI heads ( 0.2%) models. However,
the same small variation does not hold when the incentive variables are inter-
changed. In the second column we observe that the hazard rate of the TE
partners decreases from 13.9% to 9.3% and then to 6% when the TE head re-
ceives the average incentives available to the SI head or to the OE head (ZSI
and ZOE respectively).
In the same table we also report the AOW policy simulation in which the
AOW benefit of the head is made independent from income and labor participa-
tion of the partner. To be more precise we exogenously increase the TE head’s
AOW benefit after age 6518. We hold constant the model estimates and the
taste shifters of TE household ( β0s , θ0s and X 0s ) and impute a simulated
vector of incentive variables to the TE head (Zhsim). We compute again aver-
age predictions and find that the hazard of the partner diminishes in the whole
sample while the one of the head remains constant. This might indicate that
removing the penalization for the TE head of a lower AOW benefit depending
on partner’s income and participation does not modify his hazard. However the
partner shows a tendency to continue working (the hazard diminishes slightly
from 13,9% to 13%).
18The policy relevance of this simulation is explained in section 2.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
Large variations are observed in the retirement patterns of diﬀerent types of
households in the Netherlands. Singles have lower participation rates and higher
exit rates out of work than married heads. In addition when the head is out of
work, partners appear to have higher transition rates out of work. This study
focuses on the relative importance in responses of the diﬀerent types of house-
holds to specific retirement incentives. In the Netherlands the old age pension
benefit is reduced to individuals who are married to a working spouse. We have
approached the analysis of the Socio-Economic Panel data with dynamic mod-
els for family retirement behavior that acknowledge these institutional features.
Model estimates are used to decompose the diﬀerences in transition probabil-
ities as determined by diﬀerences in parameters and characteristics (i.e. the
retirement options available to the diﬀerent household types). We also used
these estimates to simulate a 10% wage increase and an exogenous increase of
the old age pension benefit for the head of a two earners household.
The empirical results and the simulation results can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• In general, we have obtained rather plausible estimation results for the
most interesting parameters.
• The wage simulation shows that singles react strongly to incentives. Low
cross wage eﬀects between working spouses are evident. Heads respond to
a wage rise by increasing a bit their labor force exit rate. The response of
the partner goes in the opposite direction.
• Incentive variables and retirement options are a relevant determinant of
retirement behavior. Diﬀerences in parameters do not ‘explain’ much of
the variation in the exit rates among groups.
• The AOW policy simulation suggests that, when we increase the old age
pension benefit to the two-earners head, the hazard of the partner might
diminish. This might imply that conditioning one’s pension benefit on
the labor market status of the spouse might induce the spouse to retire
earlier, rather than the individual to work longer.
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Estimation results
Table 4: Summary statistics: Two Earners and One Earner couples.
Explanatory note: Summary statistics do not include the observations used for the
initial condition equation
17
Table 5: Estimation results, model for couples: Two Earners and One Earner
Explanatory note: Multinomial logit coeﬃcients. Reference groups: Year 1991, Ele-
mentary education, yf,τ−1 = 2, γ2. The variance of the individual term is significant
however a test for the joint significance of this term and the gamma’s is rejected. OLF
= out of the labor force Source: SEP, own computations.
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Table 6: Estimation results: model for singles
Explanatory note: Logit coeﬃcients. Reference groups: Year 1991, Female, Elemen-
tary education, Never married singles. The likelihood ratio test for the omission of γ
and σ was rejected. OLF=out of the labour force. Source: SEP, own computations
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Table 7: Post estimation predictions. A decomposition and a policy simulation
Explanatory note: Simulations are carried out holding constant the model estimates
for couples and singles. Then the new incentive variables are imputed and the post
estimation prediction of the hazard rate into retirement is re-run. Zhsim is the imputed
vector of incentive variables of the head when his AOW is increased by 50% and made
not conditional on the partner state. OE=one earner; TE=two earners; SI=singles;
L=hazard into retirement. All figures in the table are computed as averages of the
individual predictions
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Table 8: Initial conditions equations
Explanatory note: Reference groups: Year 1990, Elementary education, Never mar-
ried singles. For total earnings we have computed the inverse hyperbolic sine f (x)=
log
¡
x+
√
x2 + 1
¢
. OLF = out of the labor force. Source: SEP, own computations
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